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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff'

vs.

~ Respondent,

J
I

' Case No.

CARL ARCHIE ANDRE\V, and )'
KENNETH ERVIN,

11158

Defendants ._~ Appellants. :

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

THE INTEREST OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, UTAH AFFILIATE AS
AMICUS CURIAE
The Utah Affiliate of the American Civil Liberties
Union is an association dedicated to the preservation
of constitutional rights and liberties. 'Ve believe that
the rights of all citizens are threatened when the rights
of any citizen are denied. 'Ve believe that there is no
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greater challenge to the liberty and security of free
citizens than occurs when a miscarriage of justice results in the conviction of men very probably innocent.
'Ve urge upon this Court that the present case is such
a case, one in which the appellants, though very probably innocent, have been convicted by reason of errors
of law and denials of constitutional rights which occurred in the proceedings below.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE AND
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Your Amicus concurs with the Statement of the
Case and Statement of Disposition below contained on
pages I to 3 of the Appellants' Brief.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
'Ve request this Court to reverse the conviction
and remand the case for a new trial. We further request
that the Court order the exclusion of eye witness identification evidence o.btained in violation of defendants'
rights.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Shortly after 6 :00 p.m. on June 26, 1967 (Tr. 60),
Mrs. Gaydra Jackman was severely beaten over the
2
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head with a pistol and robbed of seven dollars and a
watch by a stranger who entered her home in Juab
County, about four blocks from Highway 91 and some
five miles from Nephi, Utah (Tr. 32}. The intruder
was accompanied by another man who was outside the
Jackman house for most of the time during the course
of the incident. Both of these men were described by
Mrs. Jackman as Negroes.
On June 29, 1967, the defendants Carl Andrew
and Kenneth Ervin were arrested in Rawlins ' 'VYo.
ming and brought to Utah on July 1, 1967. The basis
for the arrest was that defendants were Negroes somewhat resembling the description given by Mrs. Jackman and they had passed through Juab County on
Highway 91 on the afternoon of June 26th, accompanied by Kenneth Ervin's mother and his nine year
old brother. The sheriff's department had learned of
their presence in the county from a service station operator in Levan, Utah. Indeed, Kenneth Ervin had left
his name and his mother's address in Rawlins with the
service station operator because Kenneth had rented
a tow chain to use in towing his disabled car to Rawlins.
Kenneth left his name, Rawlins address, and a cash
deposit, intending to return the chain and recover his
deposit on his return trip to Los Angeles (Tr. 167168). A witness testified that two other men driving
an old car came into her parents' restaurant in Levan
at about 3 :00 p.m. on June 26th. The witness described
one man as dark, medium height and slender, "more
Mexican than Negro," and wearing a charcoal and
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white jacket (Tr. 201). The witness also described
this man as "sarcastic" (Tr. 198) and testified that
they drove north toward Nephi (Tr. 199) . The witness further testified that the defendants were not these
men (Tr. 199). Except for the fact that the witness
described the man as more l\1exican than Negro her
description of that man basically matched the victim's
description of her assailant.
Defendant Carl Andrew is employed as a gravelcrusher in Rawlins. Defendant Kenneth Ervin is a 26year old computer operator employed in Los Angeles
(Tr. 160). On June 25, 1967, Ervin left Los Angeles
by car on a two-week vacation to visit his mother in
Rawlins (Tr. 161). His car broke down in Levan,
Utah (Tr. 165) . Upon learning that his car needed
major repairs (Tr. 91), he called his mother and told
her of his predicament (Tr. 166). Mrs. Ervin arranged
to drive to Levan, accompanied by her nine year old
son and by Carl Andrew, a neighbor and friend, to
pick up Kenneth and tow his disabled car to Rawlins.
They arrived at Levan at approximately noon on June
2t6h (Tr. 231). Ervin and Andrew disconnected the
drive shaft on Ervin's car (Tr. 167) , and chained Ervin's car to the back of Mrs. Ervin's car with the rented
chain. They then left Levan at about 1 :45 or 2 :00 p.m.
(Tr. 220, 168), stopping in Nephi for some hamburgers
(Tr. 169) , and making several other stops, near Mona,
north of Provo, in a gas station in Salt Lake County,
and at the Last Chance Cafe in Parley's Canyon. Two
disinterested witnesses placed defendants in Salt Lake
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County between 5 :00 and 6 :00 p.m. A fourteen year
old boy testified that the two chained cars drove into his
father's gas station at "106 South State Street, Salt
Lake County" (Tr. 181), at, he guessed, about 5:00
p.m. (Tr. 182). On cross-examination, he admitted he
was not sure about the time and it could have been as
late as 9 :00 p.m. But another witness, the co-owner of
the Last Chance Cafe, located in Parley's Canyon east
of Salt Lake City, was positive the defendants stopped
at his place around 5:30 and certainly no later than
6 :00 p.m. (Tr. 190, 193-4). This would have made it
virtually impossible for defendants to have been at
the Jackman home at the time the crime was committed.
The defendants testified in their own behalf and
denied any connection with the assault on Mrs. Jackman. Ervin's mother and nine year old brother also
denied the defendants committed the crime. The defense sought to introduce evidence of the good character
and good reputation of the defendants through a
neighbor who attended church with the Ervin family
and knew both Kenneth Ervin and Carl Andrew well
and knew their reputation in the community, but the
trial court limited such testimony to reputation for
veracity. The testimony of Andrew's employer was
also limited to reputation for veracity (Tr. 213, 214,
217).

The prosecution's case turned almost exclusively
on the victim's in-court identification. There were no
fingerprints, and no real or scientific evidence. Yet

5
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the victim admitted that she had never before seen a
Negro close up (Tr. 69), and did not have her glasses
on at the time and without her glasses she had difficulty
seeing things more than four feet away (Tr. 70). The
only corroboration of the victim's identification was the
notably weak testimony of Don Hatch Warner, a witness who drove by the Jackman house at about 4 :45
p.m. (Tr. 127), and noticed as he passed, a car with
a white back (Tr. 134), parked in the yard. (.Mrs.
Ervin's car is two-tone, red and white.) This witness
also testified that he saw a tall Negro in the yard, but
could not see his face (Tr. 135). Nevertheless, he identified Andrew as the man he saw because the man walked
slowly (Tr. 129), the way he saw Andrew walk in
court (Tr. 130) . The witness admitted he could not
be positive in his identification (Tr. 135). Significantly,
the witness testified to seeing only one car in the Jackman yard (Tr. 131 ) and further testified that he did
not see another parked car on his way back to Nephi
(Tr. 132). Since it is clear that Ervin's car was inoperative, the failure to account for that car is another
significant gap in the prosecution theory.
The victim testified that she saw defendants in a
lineup at the state prison conducted on July 5, 1967.
She admitted to having some difficulty in identifying
defendant Ervin at the lineup. She had difficulty identifying Ervin at the lineup even though the two defendants were the only men in the lineup matching the
description she had given of the men who had entered
her home (Tr. 63, 64, 66, {:i8) . Indeed, of the other four

6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

men in the lineup, two were not even Negroes and each
of the other two Negroes had such distinctive features
that they could be eliminated for that reason. One of
the other Negroes was totally, even strikingly bald. The
other man was stocky (Tr. 67) and had a noticeablv
flattened nose which the witness could recall at triai,
two months later (Tr. 66).
The defendants were not advised of their right
to have counsel present at the lineup and no counsel
for defendants was present (Hearing on Motion for
New Trial P. 7) . Though the victim's trial testimony
gives the impression that she did actually identfy both
defendants at the lineup, the statement of the county
attorney shows she was not able to make a positive
identification of defendant Ervin immediately after
the lineup. By reason of the denial of counsel at the
lineup, the witness' failure to identify Ervin at the
lineup was not known to the defense until after the
trial was over.
On August 15, 1967, the day defendants were
arraigned on the information, the district attorney took
a sworn deposition from Gaydra Jackman, under oath,
without notice to defendants or their attorney. This
deposition was conducted in the courtroom itself by
the district attorney as if it were part of the formal
proceedings. By leading, repetitive and suggestiYe
questions concerning the witness' certainty as to the
identity of the defendants, the district attorney tended
to suggest and fix the witness' testimony, in violation

7
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of the defendants' right to be present at a deposition
and their basic right of confrontation.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ERRORS AND IMPROPRIETIES
COMMITTED BELOW ADD UP TO A GROSS
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE SINCE THE
RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE VERY PROBABLY INNOCENT.
A. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES
THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE
VERY PROBABLY INNOCENT.
The prosecution theory of the case requires one to
accept the hypothesis that a young man with an unblemished record and a responsible well-paying job
would leave his mother and nine year old brother sitting
out in a car ,on the road or in a stranger's yard while
he entered the home of a stranger and committed an
assault and robbery on a young mother. Against this
theory of the case are the facts that Ervin has a completely unblemished record and Andrew has only a
conviction for writing a bad check back in the 1930's;
no gun or other weapon was found in a search of defendant's possessions, the stolen watch was not found;
no fingerprints or other scientific or real evidence connect the defendants with the crime, they have always
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and repeatedly denied any guilt including by testimonv
at trial, a disinterested witness testified to seeing d;f endants with the two cars chained together at his senice station in Salt Lake County at a time when it would
have been virtually impossible for them to have been
there if they had committed the crime, and both Ervin's
mother and Ervin's young brother deny defendants'
guilt. Further, despite the victim's positive identification
of defendants at trial, the affidavit of the county attorney shows that she had initial difficulty in recognizing
defendant Ervin at the lineup shortly after the crime
when her recollection was freshest and less subject to
suggestion. Given these facts, it should be perfectly
clear that this case is no run of the mill robbery and
assault conviction. Yet despite the weakness of the
prosecution case and the strong showing of the innocence of defendants, the jury brought in a verdict of
guilty for both defendants after only 45 minutes of
deliberation.
'Ve will show that this verdict was a direct result
of numerous and significant errors, some of constitutional dimensions and all extremely prejudicial.
B. THE ERRORS AND IMPROPRIETIES
BELU\V CUMULATIVELY DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS CONVICTION
IS A GROSS MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
The errors below kept the jury from hearing proba tivc evidence of the good character of the defendants

9
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and rendered unreliable the key prosecution evidence,
the in-court identification of the defendants by the victim. Errors below also tainted and rendered unreliable
the only real corroborative evidence, the testimony of
the witness, Dan Hatch Warner.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF THE GOOD CHARACTER AND
GOOD REPUTATION OF THE DEFENDANTS. THIS ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL
OF THE CONVICTION IN AND OF ITSELF.
The law is clear and well settled that defendants
in a criminal case may introduce evidence of law abiding character and good reputation on the substantive
question of guilt or innocence. The rule is stated clearly
and simply in American Jurisprudence Second, 29 Am.
J ur. 2d § 388, and in Corpus Juris Secundum, 22A
C.J.S. § 676, and these treatises cite scores of cases
for the proposition but there is probably no better statement of the rule than that of this court in State v. Blue,
17 Utah 175, 53 P. 978 (1898). Mr. Justice Bartch,
speaking for the unanimous court, stated at 17 Utah
183:
"The law is well settled, at least by the weight
of recent authority, that in every criminal case
the defendant is entitled to prove his good charac·
ter. vVhere one is charged with an offense, such
evidence is admissible, regardless of the decisiYe

10
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or i~d~cisi~e character of the other testimony;
~nd it is ":'1thin. the. province of the jury to give
it such weight, m view of all the other evidence
as it may be entitled to receive. When a pers01~
is charged with the commission of an act which
is wholly inconsistent with his former conduct
and uniform course of life, justice demands that
in this extreme moment of his existence, whe~
he is about to be deprived of life or liberty, reduced to shame and disgrace, he be permitted to
show the important fact of his good character.
Such fact, considered in connection with the
criminating facts, may of itself be sufficient to
render it highly improbable that the accused
would commit the crime charged, and raise a
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury . . .
History and experience teach us that there are
cases in which the accused's sole defense is a
good character, and yet this may outweigh the
most positive proof." (Emphasis added.)
While another Utah case has considered the appropriateness of evidence of general good character to
a charge of a crime involving a particular kind of
wrongdoing, State v. Thompson, 58 Utah 291, 199 P.
161 ( 1921), it is clear that under the rule of State v.
Blue and the well settled rule of law, that general good
character was relevant to disprove guilt of the infamous
and atrocious crimes of which the defendants Ervin
and Andrew was accused. State v. Van Kuran, 25 Utah
8, 69 P.60 (1902). See also State v. Peterson, 110
Utah 413, 174 P. 2d 843 (1946), State v. Barretta,
47 Utah 479, 155 P. 343 (1916), State v. Brown, 39
Utah 140, 115 P. 994 (1911).

11
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Despite the clearly established rule, the trial court
erroneously limited the testimony of character and reputation to reputation for truthfulness and veracity. When
a defense witness, a neighbor who attended church with
the defendants, was asked, if she knew the reputation
of the defendants in the community, the trial judge
specifically stated to defense counsel at page 214 of
the transcript:
"The only question to which you may ask is
to the truthfulness and veracity. You may first
inquire as to whether or not the witness knows
the general reputation in the community in which
they live for truthfulness. If she answers that
question yes ,then you may ask what that reputation is . . . "
By reason of this ruling of the court, the neighbor
who knew defendants Ervin and Andrew socially and
testified she attended church with them was only permitted to be asked about defendants' reputation for
truthfulness and defendant Andrew's employer, who
had employed him for about six years and had known
him for twelve years, was similarly limited in his testimony to Andrew's reputation for truthfulness. When
the witness was asked, "'Vhat type of employee has
he been," the witness was not allowed to answer because
the c.ourt ruled it to be "irrelevant and immaterial."
Clearly, these rulings were error.
Given the posture of this case, in which defendants
were being tried for a brutal and infamous crime in a
community in which they were strangers from out of

12
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state, their good character and good reputation were
matters vital to their defense. Indeed, good reputation
and alibi are the only defenses available to counter a
criminal charge premised upon a mistaken eye-witness
identification. Defendants sought to make both these
defenses as well as showing the inappropriateness of
the identification. If the jury had been permitted to
hear and consider the evidence of good character and
good reputation they could not have failed to be influenced in their verdict. Thus for this reason itself, independent of all the other errors committed below, justic~
requires that this court reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.

POINT III
THE KEY PROSECUTION EVIDENCE,
THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANTS BY THE VICTIM, GAYDRA JACKMAN, WAS HIGHLY UNRELIABLE IN ITSELF AND BY REASON OF THE IMPROPER
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 'VHICH
OCCURRED PRIOR TO TRIAL.
As a matter of legal science it is now generally
recognized that eye-witness identification by a single
witness is extremely weak and unreliable evidence.
Many commentators and Judges have noted that eyewitness identification, however certain the witness may
be, tends to be extremely unreliable. A recent and ex-
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haustive work, Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in
Criminal Cases, ( 1965), notes that the likelihood of
error is greater when the identification is made by a
single witness, at page 11; and where the witness is
identifying persons of a different race, at page 122.
Justice Frankfurter, while a professor at Harvard,
wrote that:
"The identification of strangers is proverbially
untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony
are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American
Trials."
Frankfurter, The case of Sacco and Vanzetti

30 (1927).

Judge Jerome Frank stated that:
" ... perhaps erroneous identification of the
accused constitutes the major cause of the known
wrongful convictions."
Frank & Frank, Not Guilty, 61 (1957)
Professor Borchard in his classic work, Convicting
the Innocent, (1932) stated at page 111:
"Perhaps the major source of these tragic
errors is an identification of the accused by the
victim of a crime of violence."
A similar statement was made by a leading American
prosecutor, Richard Kuh, formerly Chief Assistant
Prosecutor in the New York County District Attorney's Office. According to Mr. Kuh:
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"Proof that relies wholly on identifications
made by eye-witness (is) .inherently weak, persons who merely. ~aw a thief or attacker briefly,
and und~r conditions of stress may despite the
best of znten.tions-too readily be mistaken."
Kuh, Careers in Prosecution Offices, 14 Journal
of Legal Education 175, 187 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, the Lord Chief Justice of England in a
1961 case, Regina v. Parks, (1961} 1 W.L.R. 1484,
1485, felt called upon to say:
"It is well known that these questions of identification are difficult. They can lead to a miscarriage of Justice and the court though with great
hesitation has come to the conclusion that it
would be unsafe to allow this conviction to stand."

Indeed, this honorable Court has only recently had occasion to consider the unreliability of eye-witness identifications. In State v. Reeves, .... Utah 2d .... , .... P. 2d
.... , filed March 25, 1968, Justice Henriod noted for
a unanimous court that two witnesses to the crime
identified some one other than the defendant at a lineup.
Yet the court ruled that "the faulty inconsistent evidence of identification by two witnesses," did not create
a reasonable doubt as a matter of law when contrasted
with other direct and circumstantial evidence. Fortunately for the innocent man so identified in the Reeves
lineup, there were other evidence and other witnesses
and the lineup was not the basis upon which the prosecution built its case. Unfortunately for the defendants
in the present case, there is only one real witness who
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observed the criminals and physical and scientific evidence is entirely lacking. Instead, the case against
defendants turns upon the eye-witness identification by
the victim, Gaydra Jackman.
Yet this identification suffers not only from the
inherent Jifficulty of all eye-witness identifications of
unfamiliar persons but is further weakened by the
following facts, (I) The suggestiveness of the lineup,
(2) The fact that Gaydra has difficulty seeing objects
further than four feet away without her glasses and
was not wearing her glasses during the crime, (3)
The witness was naturally very upset and alarmed
during the crime, ( 4) The witness admittedly had
difficulty identifying defendant Ervin at the lineup,
and ( 5) the witness' tentative identification at the
lineup was improperly and suggestively reinforced by
the unilateral deposition taken under oath in the courtroom by the district attorney without notice to defendants or their attorney on the afternoon in which defendants were arraigned.

POINT IV
THE IMPROPER AND SUGGESTIVE
:MANNER IN WHICH THE LINEUP 'VAS
CONDUCTED PREJUDICED THE RIGHTS
OF DEFENDANTS TO A FAIR TRIAL BY
TAINTING THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANTS BY THE VIC-
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TI.M AND RENDERING THAT IDENTIFICATION UNRELIABLE.
In dealing with the problem of identification in the
courtroom, two eminent British legal scholars have
made the point that the question at trial asking a witness if he can identify the defendant is "of such trifling
probative force that it ought not to be asked, except
in the context of three other questions." These questions they urge are:
"When and in what circumstances did the witness first recognize the defendant as the man?
Did he have any difficulty in recognizing him?
And by what marks did he recognize him.?"
Williams and Hammelmann, Identification Parades, 1963 Criminal Law Review, 479, 480.

'\Te submit that the positive in-court identification
of the defendants by the victim is indeed of little probative value apart from the answers about prior identification. We submit further that though there are gaps
and inadequacies in the record resulting from the denial
of counsel at the lineup in violation of the requirement
of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 Sup. Ct.
1926, 18 L.Ed. 2d 149 ( 1967), there is enough in
the record to show that the courtroom identification
was the result of an improper lineup and improper and
suggestive practices which followed thereafter. 'Ve ask
this court to rule, as the California Supreme Court has
rule in People v .Car1uoe, 65 Cal. Rep. 336, 339, 436
P.2d 336, 339 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1968):
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"That th~ lineu~ was unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identifica~ion, and that its grossly unfair makeup deprived defendant to due process of law."
Indeed what the California Supreme Court ruled
in Carusoe applies even more strongly to this case.
There the court noted that the other participants in
the lineup did not physically resemble defendant. "They
were not his size, not one had his dark complexion, and
none had dark wavy hair." 65 Cal. Rep. 339. In the
present case only two participants in the lineup other
than defendants, were even of the same race as the
defendants. One of these Negroes was completely, even
startingly, bald and the other, though about the same
height as defendant Ervin, was considerably more
heavily built and had a distinctively flattened nose that
the witness could remember several months after the
lineup. Given these facts it is easy to conclude that
defendants could well have been selected by the process
of elimination as the only persons in the lineup who
could be said by the witness as possibly resembling the
men who committed the crimes. As the Supreme Court
of the United States made clear in United States v.
JVade, supra, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87
Sup. Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) and Stovall
·v. Deno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 Sup. Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d
1199 (1967), supra, unfair suggestive and improper
lineups are inseparably related to the later identifi·
cation of defendants in the course of trial. Here, as in
the Carusoe case, "The defendants' counsel could not
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free the defense from the taint of the improper lineup,
and his client's destiny was in a real sense, sealed by
the time the trial commenced." People v. Carusoc,
supra at 65 Cal. Rep. 341.
POINT V
IT WAS A PREJUDICIALLY IMPROPER
AND UNFAIR TACTIC FOR THE DISTRICT
ATTORNEY TO TAKE A SWORN UNILATERAL DEPOSITION OF THE VICTIM IN
THE COURTROOM WITHOUT NOTICE TO
DEFENDANTS OR THEIR ATTORNEY AND
WITHOUT THE DEFENDANTS, THEIR ATTORNEY, OR THE JUDGE BEING PRESENT, WHERE THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
USED THE DEPOSITION PROCEDURE TO
SHAPE, INFLUENCE, AND SUGGEST THE
WITNESS' TESTIMONY BY LEADING AND
REPETITIVE QUESTIONS.
Despite the fact that the witness admitted to having
some difficulty in picking defendant Ervin out of the
lineup; despite th fact that the affidavit of the County
Attorney who was present at the lineup shows that
the witness was not prepared to identify Ervin as her
assailant immediately following the lineup, the witness
at the trial testified that she was certain defendant
Ervin was the assailant and that she would never forget him. The positiveness of the witness' testimony at
trial resulted in large measure from the prosecution's
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improper and suggestive use of deposition procedures
to shape and influence the witness' testimony. Specifically, on the very afternoon on which defendants
were arraigned, the district attorney caused the witness
Gaydra Jackman to attend and submit to a deposition
taken under oath in the courtroom in which the case
was to be tried, without the presence of a judge and
without notice to or presence of defendants or their
attorney. This unilateral deposition procedure is not
authorized or sanctioned by the Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure and is completely novel and improper. Indeed express provision is made for the taking of a
witness' testimony by U.C.A. 77-15-31, but this section expressly requires notice to the defendant and
further requires that the testimony be taken before the
magistrate having jurisdiction of the charge.
At the unilateral deposition the district attorney
repeated and repeated leading and suggestive questions
which could have had no purpose and no effect other
than to shape and suggest the testimony of the witness.
Again and again, the district attorney hammered home
by leading and suggestive questions that the witness
could identify and would never forget the defendants
as the men who committed the crimes. The transcript
of the depositoin shows that no less than a dozen times,
on page 8, twice on page 15, on page 20, on page 32,
twice on page 44, three times on page 45, on page 48
and on page 49, the district attorney kept hammering
home the point through his leading questions that the
witness was sure she could identify defendants. 'Vhile
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there is certainly nothing wrong with an attorney discussing the case with a witness and going over the witness' testimony in preparation for trial, there are and
must be reasonable limits on how far an attorney may
fairly go. In this case those limits were exceeded. They
were exceeded because the questions took place in a
formal proceeding, under oath and in the courtroom,
conducted as if it were part of the official proceedings
except for the absence of the judge, the defendants
and their attorney and except for the leading and suggestive nature of the questions. The very formality
with which the deposition was conducted had a tendency to fix and shape the witness' testimony at trial.
Given the nature of the deposition and the manner
in which it was conducted, it is not surprising at all
that despite her initial difficulty in identifying defendant Ervin at the lineup shortly after the crime was
committed, she was definite in her identification at
trial and testified at page 60 of the trial transcript and
at page 89 of the trial transcript, the answer to the
question so carefully suggested and so repeatedly hammered home by the prosecutor in the course of the
unilateral deposition, that she would never forget the
defendants. Given the effect of this novel and unauthorized procedure on the witness' testimony, defendants
were denied their right to a meaningful and effective
cross-examination and confrontation of the key prosecution witness. Thus, in and of itself, the improper
deposition procedure was prejudicial error.
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POINT VI
THE DEF'ENDANTS WERE PREJUDICED BY THE ERRONEOUS AND IMPROPER DENIAL OF COUNSEL AT THE
LINEUP, A CRITICAL STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DEFENDANTS. BY
REASON OF THE DENIAL O:F COUNSEL AT
THE LINEUP, TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL
WAS HAMPERED AND PRECLUDED FROl\I
SHOWING THE VICTIJ\-I'S FAIL URE TO
MAKE A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION AT
OR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE
LINEUP.
In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 Sup.
Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 149 ( 1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 Sup. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d
1178 (1967), the United States Supreme Court recognized that a lineup at which a defendant is presented
for identification to witnesses of a crime is a critical
stage of the proceedings at which a defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel. The court expressly
ruled in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 Sup. Ct.
1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967), decided the same day
as United States v. Wade, supra, that all lineups conducted after June 12, 1967, the date of the Wade, Gilbert and Stovall decisions must comply with the requirements of Wade and Gilbert. These requirements are
stated in United States v. Wade:
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" ( B) oth Wade and his counsel should have

be~n notified of the impending lineup and coun-

sels presence should have been a requisite to
conduct of the lineup, absent an intelligent waiver. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506."
The record in this case makes clear that the standards of Wade were not met. Indeed, at the hearing on
defendants' motion f~r a new trial, it was established
by defense counsel that defendants were not informed
of their right to the presence of counsel at the lineup
and, not having been so informed, could not intelligently waive that right. While there was testimony
that a lawyer may have been informed that a lineup
would be held in the future, that lawyer testified that
he did not regard himself as representing the defendants and thus did not take any action in relation to
such advice. Indeed, it is clear that the trial judge's
decision denying the motion for new trial was erroneously based upon a misreading of the requirements
of the Wade rule. As the trial judge stated at the
hearing in the motion, at page 42:
"What your cases say, if I understand them
correctly is that such viewing or lineup must be
conducted properly, and that's the purpose for
having an attorney there."
As the Wade case makes clear, the major purpose

for requiring an attorney at the lineup is not just to
assure that the lineup is fairly conducted but to permit
effective confrontation and cross examination at the
trial as to how the lineup was conducted and whether
and how the witness was able to identify the suspects.
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Indeed, the instant case is a clear example of the prejudicial results of denying counsel at the lineup. Though
defense counsel sought to challenge the lineup identification by questioning the witness about it, he was unable to develop the facts or show more than the fact
that the witness had trouble in identifying the defendant
Ervin until he put on his glasses.
The error resulting from the failure to comply with
the rule of United States v. Wade was not waived either
by defendant's failure to demand the presence of counsel
at the lineup or by the defense failure to object to the
in-court identification at trial.
It is clear that there can be no waiver of important
constitutional rights by mere default, in the absence
of knowledge of those rights for a waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege," Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464,
58 Sup. Ct. 1019 ,1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938); Carnley
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 Sup. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed.
2d 70 ( 1962). Since defendants were not informed of
their rights to have counsel present at the lineup they
cannot intelligently have waived such right.

The Miranda warning adverted to by the trial
judge in stating his denial of the motion for new trial
is merely a warning relating to interrogations and questioning. Even an astute lawyer could not be expected
to know from the Miranda warning that a defendant
is entitled to the presence of counsel during a lineup.
Certainly laymen would have no such knowledge.

24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As to the failure to object during the trial itself,
certainly it is clear that defense counsel sought to raise
the issue of the appropriateness of the lineup. Indeed,
it must be noticed that in the Wade case itself, the issue
was raised by a motion for a judgment of acquittal or
alternatively to strike the courtroom identification at
the close of the testimony of the case. In any event
since the violation of the Wade rule was so prejudicial
and so significant in the light of the total evidence
and posture in this case, this court should not permit
this conviction to stand despite the error, merely because of defense counsel's failure to make a motion to
strike the in-court identification testimony. C.f. Henr;lj
v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 85 Sup. Ct. 564, 13 L. Ed.
2d 408 (1965).
While in Simmons v. United States, .... U.S .... .,
89 Sup. Ct. 967, .... L. Ed. 2d .... , (1968), the Court
ruled that when tested by the totality of the surrounding circumstances test of Stovall v. Denno, supra, a preW ade identification from photographs was not so improper under the circumstances as to require reversal,
it is clear that the Court was limiting its ruling to extrajudicial identifications by photograph. So too, Biggers
v. Tennessee, .... U.S .... ., 89 Sup. Ct. 979, .... L. Ed.
2d ... ., ( 1968) , in which the Court sustained a pre-Wade
identification by an equally divided court, does not
affect the rule of Wade as applied to lineups and other
viewings of defendants occurring after the date of the
Wade decision.
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It should be noted that the present case which turns
upon the applicability of the rule of United States v.
Wade, supra, to lineups conducted after June 12, 1967,
is distinguishable from the situations presented to this
court in State v. Workman, ____ Utah 2d .... , 435 P. 2d
919 ( 1968); Nielsen v. 1 1urner, ____ Utah 2d ____ , 435 P.
2d 921 ( 1968) ; and Dyett v. Turner, ____ Utah 2d .... ,

---- P. 2d .... , (1968). In those cases this
that newly fashioned federal constitutional
not apply retroactively to practices and
which had occurred before the date of the
Stovall v. Denno, supra, at 388 U.S.:

court ruled
rulings did
procedures
rulings. In

"'Ve hold that Wade and Gilbert affect only
those cases and all future cases which involve
confrontation~ for identification purposes conducted in the absence of counsel after this date."
(Emphasis added.)

In numerous cases decided since Wade and Stovall
state and federal courts have recognized and stated
that lineups conducted after June 12, 1967, must be
conducted in accordance with the Wade rule.
The present case is a striking example of the reason
for the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v.
TVade, supra. For here there is a clear and striking
example of just the kind of unfairness the Supreme
Court was seeking to prevent. Not only was the lineup
unduly suggestive and unfair but, unknown to trial
defense counsel until after the trial the chief prosecution witness failed to make a positive identification of
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the defendant Ervin. Yet when cross examined about
her identification at the lineup the witness unwittingly
gaye the impression that she had made a positive identification of Ervin at the lineup after he put on dark
glasses (Tr. 74). In fact she did not make a positive
identification at the lineup and the time when she saw
him in dark glasses was long after the lineup. Yet this
erroneous impression was not corrected by the district
attorney and the defense counsel was not aware at the
time that the impression was erroneous.
POINT VII
IT 'VAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ADMIT THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF
THE DEFENDANT ANDREW BY THE WITNESS DAN HATCH WARNER SINCE HIS
TESTIMONY AT TRIAL WAS OBTAINED
BY A SHOCKING AND FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE DEFENDANTS IN CIR CUMSTANCES TENDING TO MAKE SUCH TESTIMONY INHERENTLY UNRELIABLE.
We have urged above that the identification testimony of the victim, Gaydra .Jackman, was tainted by
the failure to comply with the requirements of United
States v. Wade, supra, applicable to all lineups conducted after June 12, 1967. What we have urged above
applied with even greater force to the testimony of the
witness Dan Hatch 'Varner. 'Vhile the testimony of
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this witness tended to be merely corroborative, the vi0 .
~ation of the Wade rule was even more flagrant and
improper.
Dan Hatch Warner testified at trial that he observed the defendant Carl Archie Andrew walking
around outside the Jackman home, the scene of the
crime, at about the time the crime was alleged to have
occurred. This testimony tended to corroborate the
testimony of the victim and was certainly prejudicial
to defendants. While the witness testified that he wasn't
positive in his identification, he did answer yes to the
question, "With respect to the man you saw at ... the
.Jackman residence on or about the 26th day of June,
1967, do you recognize one of these men as being that
man?"
This testimony by witness Warner was obtained
by a direct, blatant, and grossly improper violation of
the rule of United States v. Wade, supra, reinforced by
an improper and suggestive unilateral deposition ob·
tained by the district attorney on August 15, 1967.
On August 15, 1967, the date of arraignment on
the information, the district attorney had the witness,
Mr. 'Varner, attend the court and observe defendants
under circumstances extremely suggestive that they
were the ones who had committed the crime. Later oil
the same day, without notice to defendants or their
counsel, the district attorney conducted a unilateral
deposition in the district courtroom with the witness
under oath in the presence of the sheriff, the county
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attorney, and a court reporter - in the presence of
everyone but those persons whom common decency and
the basic standards of American law would suggest
ought to be present-the defendants and their attorney.
The witness was sworn and then by leading and
suggestive questions, led to state that he could identify
one of the defendants.
Given the fact that the witness' te~timony itself
shows he had only a momentary observation of the man
he identified as defendant Andrew and did not even
see the man's face, and did not identify him until after
he saw him in court as a defendant at the arraignment,
the manner in which this identification was made and
the suggestive deposition in which it was reinforced
made the admission of Warner's testimony at trial
a violation of due process of law, under the rule of
United States v. Wade, Gilbert v. California, and
Stovall v. Denno. Since the testimony of the witness,
'i\Tarner was the only significant corroboration of the
identification by the victim, its admission was prejudicial error as well as a violation of due process of law.
For as the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
stated in Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F. 2d 199, 202 (1966):
"A state may not rely in a criminal prosecution ... on an identification secured by a process
in which the search for truth is made secondary
to the question for conviction."
The present case demonstrates that, when the search
for truth is subordinated to the quest for conviction,
injustice may result.
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POINT VIII
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE WHAT.
EVER, UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD
HAVE FOUND DEFENDANT ANDREW TO
BE GUILTY AS AN ACCESSORY.
While we urge that the record demonstrates thal
the conviction of both defendants was clearly errone·
ous, our duty to the Court and to defendants compeh
us to urge as well, a particular ground of error on
behalf of defendant Andrew. Specifically, even assum
ing, contrary to the evidence, that defendant Ervll;
was guilty, there is no evidence to support the convic·
tion of Andrew as an accessory. U.C.A. 76-1-46 de·
fines as accessories :
All persons who, after full knowledge that a
felony has been committed, conceal it from a
magistrate, or harbor and protect the person who
committed it . . .
Since defendant Andrew 'vas originally charged as a
principal, it is obvious that the accessory charge cannot
be based upon his failure to reveal any knowledge ht
may have had to the magistrate before whom he him
self was charged. Thus, the only basis for the accesson
charge woud be that he "harbored and protected" de
fendant Ervin. But there is not a shred of evidenc1
to show this. The record shows that Andrew was a guesi
in the car of Ervin's mother. Can it be said that by rid
ing in another's car back to his own home, he harbore1
and protected another guest, the son of the car's owner

1
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w·ould

he have had to have refused to ride in the car
and have left himself stranded far from home in a
State where he was a stranger to avoid being an accessory? Certainly, there is nothing in the record besides
the fact that Andrew accompanied the Ervin family
back to Wyoming, which would indicate harboring and
protecting. Clearly, one who merely fails to make a
citizen's arrest or report the crime to the police i!) not
guilty as an accessory. 22 Corpus Juris Secundum,
§ 99 ( d), (e)
CONCLUSION
Your Amicus respectfully urges that by reason of
the numerous and significant errors, each of which was
prejudicial, the conviction in this case was a miscarriage
of justice. Accordingly, we urge this Court to reverse
the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
I. DANIEL STEWART
LIONEL H. FRANKEL
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